The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Arbitration: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal by Mosk, Richard M.
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 14
1-1-1988
The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in
International Arbitration: The Experience of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Richard M. Mosk
Substitute Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1984
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard M. Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Arbitration: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, 1 Transnat'l Law. 253 (1988).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol1/iss1/14
The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators
in International Arbitration: The




In some types of arbitrations there are three or more arbitrators.
Often, each party will appoint an arbitrator ("party-appointed ar-
bitrator") and those party-appointed arbitrators will choose the other
arbitrator(s). Sometimes the non party-appointed arbitrator(s) will be
chosen by an independent institution or other designated appointing
authority.
Although more expensive, it is often considered desirable to have
three arbitrators, two of whom are party-appointed, especially in
large, complicated cases. Party-appointed arbitrators bring expanded
knowledge and experience to the decision-making process. They should
have knowledge of the laws, practices and customs of the nation or
business of the parties who appoint them. Thus, party-appointed
arbitrators can insure that positions and arguments of the parties
that appointed them are considered and understood by the other
arbitrators.
Party-appointed arbitrators can help in reducing the possibility that
there will be major misunderstandings by the other arbitrators. Thus,
they can therefore reduce the risk of an unjustified award that could
* A.B. 1960, Stanford University; J.D. 1963, Harvard Law School; Member of California
Bar; Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-84; Substitute Judge, Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal 1984 to present.
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be rendered by a sole arbitrator. This is important, as arbitral awards
are infrequently subject to successful judicial attack for errors of
fact or law. The presence of party-appointed arbitrators may make
any aware more acceptable to a losing party. Different viewpoints
can have a salutary effect, and more than one arbitrator can be
helpful in resolving complicated cases in the time allotted for an
arbitration. I
Diverse views exist regarding the duties, obligations and practices
of arbitrators appointed by each of the parties when there is an
arbitration panel consisting of three or more members. Thus, ques-
tions arise as to whether party-appointed arbitrators are to be inde-
pendent of the parties that appointed them, whether they are to be
impartial, whether they can engage in ex parte communications with
the parties that appointed them, and as to the necessity and extent
of the disclosure of their relationships. Practices relating to the role
of such party-appointed arbittators vary by the subject, place and
type of arbitration involved.
More and more United States lawyers and arbitrators are engaging
in international arbitration.2 Based on their domestic experiences,
United States practitioners may not be familiar with the standards
applicable to party-appointed arbitrators in such international arbi-
trations.
International arbitrations-i.e., for the most part, where the parties
are from or are different states or the subject is transnational3 -can
be conducted pursuant to and under the supervision of a permanent
institution or can be ad hoc. The American Arbitration Association
provides for international arbitrations. 4 The International Chamber
1. See M. Domke Commercial Arbitration § 20.03 (Wilner rev. ed. 1984).
2. See Lutz and Mosk, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 L.A. LAW. 58 (Dec.
1985); Aksen, International Arbitration-Its Time Has Arrived, 14 CAsE W. Ras. J. INT L L.
247 (1982).
3. This shorthand definition is used for this article without attempting to resolve the
complex issue of the definition of an international arbitration. In French law, an arbitration
is considered to be international if it involves interests of international trade. Code de procddure
Civile [C. PR. Crv]. art. 1492 (Fr.); see UNCITRAL Model Law in International Commercial
Arbitration, Art. 1(3), UNCITRAL Report of the Working Group on International Contract
Practices on the Work of its Seventh Session 6 (March 1984), 24 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]; Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 ARn. INT'L
6 (1985) (reproducing and discussing the UNCITiAL Model Law).
4. American Arbitration Association (AAA), Supplementary Procedures for International
Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in VIII ComasEzRcx ARBrrRATION Y.B. (International
Council for Commercial Arbitration) 195-96 [hereinafter CommexA. AnrrAiboN Y.B.];
AAA, Procedures for Cases under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, reprinted in VIlI
CommERcIL ARBnTRATION Y.B. at 196-98, modified XXII CommERCIAL ARBrIRATiON Y.B. 196.
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of Commerce is one of the oldest, permanent institutions dealing
with international arbitration. In addition, international arbitral in-
stitutions are located in various cities around the world, including
Los Angeles, London, Vancouver, and Hong Kong, 5 and there are
specific institutions to handle arbitrations involving governments.
6
A number of specialized arbitration associations exist which su-
pervise international disputes and which often utilize professional
arbitrators. For example, certain arbitration associations specialize in
maritime, commodity, textile, motion picture, and labor arbitrations.
7
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the largest international
claims settlement program ever undertaken, exposed many lawyers
and business executives to international arbitration. This experience
may lead to-the increased use of international arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism. Also, the tribunal's practices and jurispru-
dence have been and will be instructive in the field of international
arbitration.8 Although much has been written about the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal and its proceedings,9 there has been little
analysis of what lessons should be derived from the Tribunal regard-
ing the role of the party-appointed arbitrator in international arbi-
tration. This article will briefy set forth some views of the role of
the party-appointed arbitrator in domestic and international arbitra-
tion. The article will then deal with the position of the party-
appointed arbitrator at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.10-
5. See AAA, Sunvny OF INTEmNATIONAL Anrr ao N Srrns (1984); Carter, International
Commercial Arbitration in 163 PLI LmTGAT N & AnismisrwAnvE PRACnCE SERMS 239 (1980);
Branson and Tupman, Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective International
Arbitration, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 917 (1984); See, e.g., List of Arbitral Institutions, ComcrCIAL
ARrrRATioN Y.B.
6. Arbitrations involving governments are provided for, inter alia, by the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague.
7. See, e.g., Van Delden, English Commodity Arbitrations: A Foreigner Looking Around
in London, in Tan ART oF ARnriiLknoN 95 (J. Schultsz & A.J. van den Berg eds. 1982).
8. Mosk, Lessons From The Hague-An Update on the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, 14 P~sannm L. REv. 819, 825 (1987).
9. See, e.g., THE IAN -Um'TD SrxAs CLAIS T.muNAL 1981-1983 (R. Lillich ed. 1984);
Stewart, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: A Review of Developments 1983-1984, 16
L. PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 677 (1984); Lowenfeld, The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: An Interim
Appraisal, 38 AB. J. 14 (1983); Audit, Le Tribunal des Differends Irano-Americains (1981-
1984), 122 JoUmA Du DRorr INTERNATIoNAL 79 (1985); Tzu-Wen Lee, The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal and the Questions of the Nationality of the Claimants and Compensation for
Expropriation, 4 CHImsE Y.B. INT'L L. & AsF. 129 (1984).
10. This article generally will refer to published material and not to deliberations and
other matters presently considered confidential.
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II. UNITED STATES PRACTICE
In the United States, arbitration is a contractual process. Thus,
within limits, the parties are free to adopt any arbitral mechanism.
As one court noted,
As a general rule, since arbitration is a contractual method of
settling disputes, whom the parties choose to act as an arbitrator is
a matter of their own judgment. An interest in the dispute or a
relationship with a party, if known to the parties to the agreement
when the arbitrator is chosen, will not disqualify the arbitrator
from acting.'"
Despite this principle, there appear to be some limits on party
autonomy. The United States Supreme Court in a labor context
noted, "Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement
arrangements... , but it was anticipated we are sure, the contractual
machinery would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."' 2
Because of the belief in party autonomy in this country, the parties
can establish an arbitral tribunal composed of party-appointed ar-
bitrators who are not independent or impartial, at least when the
neutral arbitrator is independent and impartial.
Nevertheless, there still remains some confusion over the role and
objigations of the party-appointed arbitrator absent a clear expression
by the parties in advance of the arbitration.
In some types of arbitration there is a long established practice
that an arbitrator appointed by one party need not be impartial or
independent. Thus, for example, in so called tripartite labor arbitra-
tions in the United States, labor and management members of the
arbitral body often are considered as partisans and act as advocates
for their respective sides.' 3 Indeed, the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility for Arbitrators of Labor Management Disputes states in its
Preamble that it "does not apply to partisan representatives on
tripartite boards.' 14
11. In Re Cross & Brown Company, 4 A.D.2d 501, 576, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 573 (1957).
12. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976); see Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 825, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 615 (1981).
13. F. Emoum & E. EuIouar, How ARsrtaaAoN WoR'.s 129-31 (4th ed. 1985); 0.
FmwFRaTmR, PRACTICE AND PRocEDuR n LABoR AmnrmrAToN 86 (2nd ed. 1983); see
Lesser, Tripartite Boards or Single Arbitrators in Voluntary Labor Arbitration, 5 ARB. J. 276
(1950).
14. Promulgated by a Committee of the American Arbitration Association, National
Academy of Arbitrators and by representatives of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, approved 1975; last amended May 29, 1985.
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It has been suggested that in normal commercial cases party-
appointed arbitrators need not be impartial.5 Section 12 of the
Uniform Arbitration Act provides for vacating an award in case of
evident partiality "by an arbitrator appointed as neutral," but does
not so provide with respect to a party-appointed arbitrator. Thus, it
has been said that the Act "recognizes that party-designated arbitra-
tors represent their nominators and may act as advocatgs."'
16
The New York Court of Appeals stated:
Arising out of the repeated use of the tripartite arbitral board, there
has grbwn a common acceptance of the fact that the party-desig-
nated arbitrators are not and cannot be "neutral," at least in the
sense that the third arbitrator ot a judge is. And, as might be
expected, the literature is replete with references both to arbitrators
who are "neutrals" and those who -are "partial," "partisan" or
"interested" and fo arbitration boards composed entirely of "neu-
trals" and those contrastingly denominated "tripartite in their mem-
bership." (citations omitted)
In short, usage and experience indicate that, in the type of
tripartite arbitration envisaged by the contract before us, each
party's arbitrator "is not individually expected to be neutral.1 17
A federal court has stated with respect to the arbitration proceeding
before it that party-appointed arbitrators "are partisans once removed
from the actual controversy." '18 Other courts have indicated with
respect to the arbitration clauses before them that, "[a]n arbitrator
selected by one of the contesting parties is effectively an advocate of
such party."' 9 There are even cases which suggest that a party-
appointed arbitrator can be an attorney for his nominator and need
not make a disclosure of his relationship with a party or subject.
20
There are, however, different views as to the position of the party-
appointed arbitrator. Judge Pound of the New York Court of Appeal
long ago stated,
15. Washington Foreign Law Society Committee on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, app. F. at 7, reprinted in 2 INT'VL ARB. Rm. 779, 820
(Nov. 1987).
16. Note, Party-Designated Arbitrators and the Duty to Disclose in Tripartite Commercial
Arbitration: Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 4 C~nnozo L. Ray. 173,
180 (1982); see Pirsig, The New Uniform Arbitration Act; 11 Bus. LAw. 44, 48 (1956).
17. Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater. N.Y., 11 N.Y. 2d 128, 136,
182 N.E. 2d 85, 87, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404-05 (1962); see also Tipton v. Systron Donner
Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 501, 505, 160 Cal. Rpfr. 303, 305 (1979) ("There is no statutory
requirement that the arbitrators appointed by the parties must be neutral or impartial.").
18. Stef Shipping Corp. v. Norris Grain Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19. Johnson v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 147 So. 2d 247, 248 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
20. See Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 501, 160 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1979).
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[Tihe practice of arbitrators of conducting themselves as champions
of their nominators is to be condemned as contrary to the purpose
of arbitrations, and as calculated to bring the system of enforced
arbitrations into disrepute. An arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity, and should possess the judicial qualifications of fairness
to both parties, so that he may render a faithful, honest, and
disinterested opinion. He is not an advocape whose function is to
convince the umpire or third arbitrator .... He must lay aside all
bias, and approach the cause with a mind open to conviction and
without regard to his previously formed opinions as to the merits
of the party or the cause. He should sedulously refrain from any
conduct which might justify even the inference that either party is
the special recipient of his solicitude or favor.2'
And more recently, in vacating an award because of the partiality
of a party-appointed arbitrator, the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
in a 4-3 decision, endorsed Judge Pound's statement, and although
noting that, "standards pertaining to the requisite impartiality of the
party-designated arbitrators are not susceptible to precise formulation
in the abstract," the court stated that the "parties may agree to any
form of dispute resolution that they wish, but they must not seek
the backing of the courts for private actions that, while substituting
for the judicial function, are fraught with the appearance of bias."'
A federal court, in referring to the Federal Arbitration Act 2 stated:
The view that Congress contemplated when enacting the Act that
the parties would appoint partisan arbitrators is rebutted by the
express language of 10(b). That section provides that the court shall
vacate the award, "Where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators, or either of them." . . . This underlined language
directs that the evident partiality test should apply to every member
of the panel.u
In 1977, a Joint Committee consisting of a Special Committee of
the American Arbitration Association and a Special Committee of
the American Bar Association (AAA-ABA Committee) promulgated
a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in commercial disputes. 2 In the
21. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 405, 148 N.E.
562, 564 (1925).
22. Barcon Associates v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 430 A.2d 214, 219
(1981).
23. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982).
24. Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. Motor Tank Vessel, Akti, 438 F. Supp. 153, 159
(E.D.N.C. 1977).
25. See Holtzmann, The First Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 33
Bus. LAw. 309 (1977).
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preamble it is stated with respect to three member arbitral tribunals
which include two party-appointed arbitrators, the "sponsors of this
Code believe that it is preferable for parties to agree that all arbi-
trators shall comply with the same ethical standards"-Le., act as
neutrals. The Code, in Canon VII, recognizes, however, that there
are different practices and notes,
In all arbitrations in which there are two or more party-appointed
arbitrators, it is important for everyone concerned to know from
the start whether the party-appointed arbitrators are expected to be
neutrals or non-neutrals. In such arbitrations, the two party-ap-
pointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals unless both
parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be
neutral, or unless the contract, the applicable arbitration rules, or
any governing law requires that all three arbitrators are to be neutral.
Those arbitrators referred to as "non-neutral" arbitrators, according
to the Canon, may be "predisposed" toward the party who appointed
them, but in all other respects are obligated to act in good faith and
with integrity and fairness. They are to disclose all interests and
relationships required to be disclosed. They are not-to have exparte
communications with a party, except in connection with the appoint-
ment of the neutral arbitrator. If they have, or intend to have, such
ex parte communications, they are to disclose to the other arbitrators
and the parties any such communications prior to their appointment
and their intention, if they have any, to engage in such communi-
cations after appointment. They are not to delay or disrupt the
proceedings. In reaching this ethical rule, the AAA-ABA Committee
sought to embody in its Code of Ethics the concept expressed by the
court in Astoria Medical Group v. Helth Insurance Plan of Greater
New York,2 which said,
Our decision that an arbitrator may not be disqualified solely
because of a relationship to his nominator or to the subject matter
of the controversy does not, however, mean that he may be deaf
to the testimony or blind to the evidence presented. Partisan he
may be, but not dishonest.
The AAA-ABA (Committee in its Code of Ethics provides for
either neutral or nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators, depending
upon the choice of the parties.
26. 11 N.Y.2d 128, 135, 182 N.E.2d 85, 89, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404-05 (1962).
259
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III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
There seems to be a tendency towards requiring party-appointed
arbitrators to be independent and impartial in international commer-
cial arbitration. Indeed, as the AAA-ABA Committee stated in Canon
VII of its Code of Ethics "It should be noted that in cases where
the arbitration is conducted outside the United States the applicable
law may require that all arbitrators .be neutral." 27 It has been said
that in "European practice, failure of the entire tribunal, including
the party-appointed arbitrators, to conform to strict standards of
independence and impartiality may constitute a professional fault, a
serious procedural defect affecting the validity of the award."' 2
One authoritative work on International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) arbitrations stated, "According to the general European con-
cept of arbitration, such a nominee [party-appointed] should not be
or act as the nominating party's agent or representative. " 29 Another
writer noted,
There is a question whether a party-appointed arbitrator should be
"impartial and independent." The general custom in Europe is so
to consider a party-appointed arbitrator .... Some international
lawyers in the United States prefer that party-appointed arbitrators
Aot be required to be independent, particularly in cases that bridge
differing cultures such as East-West or U.S.-China disputes. Other
experienced lawyers are prepared in international cases to follow
the more general international practice under which party-appointed
arbitrators are elected to be independent of those who appoint
them. 0
Most rules for institutional international arbitrations and European
arbitration laws make no distinctions between party-appointed and
non party-appointed arbitrators for purposes of their independence
and impartiality. 31 This is also true of the recent UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Law.
27. AAA-ABA Committee Code of Ethics, Canon VII (emphasis added).
28. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational View, 1 J. INT'L
ARB. 7, 13 (1984).
29. W. CRAio, W. PARK & J. PAUssON, IN ,RATONAL CRAMR op COmMRCE Anzx-
TRA-rOx pt. III 31 (1985) [hereinafter CaRso].
30. Strauss, The Growing Consensus on International Commercial Arbitration, 68 Am. J.
INT'L L. 709, 714 (1974).
31. See International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules art. 2(4) [hereinafter ICC
Rules]; The Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, 4 Code of Civil Procedure arts. 1020-76
(1838), reprinted in 12 CoMRCIL Aimnr.Anox Y.B. 370-87.
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A Canadian court stated,
From its inception arbitration has been held to be of the-nature of
judicial determination and to entail incidents appropriate to that
fact. The arbitrators are to exercise their function not as the
advocates of the parties nominating them, and a fortiori of one
party when they are agreed upon by all, but with as free, inde-
pendent and impartial minds as the circumstances permit. In par-
ticular they must be untrammelled by such influences as to a fair-
minded person would raise a reasonable doubt of that impersonal
attitude which each party is entitled to. 32
In ICC arbitrations, a party "nominated" arbitrator is required to
disclose to the court any interest or fact bearing on the nominee's
independence. The court then "appoints" the nominee. 3 The ICC
has the authority to disapprove a party-appointed arbitrator on the
basis of lack of independence, but the parties may agree to waive
the requirement of independence of the party-appointed arbitrators.
Such express agreements are "rare in ICC practice," 34 which could
reflect the fact that impartiality of party appointed arbitrators may
be required by local law. Of course there are instances where, after
disclosure, none of the parties challenge a party-appointed arbitrator
who may not be independent.
The Code of Ethics for International Arbitrators promulgated 'by
the International Bar Association provides strict rules for independ-
ence and impartiality of arbitrators, and makes no distinction between
party-appointed or non party-appointed arbitrators. 35
Some have attempted to delineate the borders of impartiality. As
is stated in one work,
A party is clearly entitled to (and often does) choose an arbitrator
having that party's nationality. The nationality may also come from
a similar economic, political and social milieu, and may therefore
be expected to be sympathetic to positions taken by that party. He
may also embrace legal doctrines that the nominating party feels
1
32. Szilard v. Szasz 1 D.L.R. 370, 371 (Can. 1955); R. McLAnnI AN E. PAramM, Tn
Ltw mm PtAcric op ComamcL A R.rToN 47 (1982).
33. ICC Rules art. 2(4) (San. 1, 1988).
34. CFAiG, supra note 29, pt. III, at 31.
35. IBA Ethics for International Arbitration, reprinted in 2 ITr'rL Ain. REP. 287 (April
1987) [hereinafter IBA Ethics]. See Coulson, An American Critique of the MBA's Ethics for
International Arbitrators, 4 J. , r'L ARB. 103, 104-05 (1987) (raises question as to whether
there is a worldwide "consensus" that party-appointed arbitrators are impartial). It should be
noted that the IBA Code of Ethics uses the term "bias" as being equivalent to lack of
"impartiality and independence." IBA Ethics, supra, rule 3.1.
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are favorable to its case. It is in this limited sense that the party-
nominated arbitrators need not be "neutral." 36
There are indications that those in the United States, including
United States courts, may not recognize any distinction between
domestic and international arbitrations with respect to party-ap-
pointed arbitrators-at least in cases subject to United States law.
In a case involving an international arbitration the court stated that
"[g]enerally, partisan arbitrators are permissible." 37 A practitioner
of international arbitration has noted, "Many clients assume that
the arbitrator they name will favor their case, will be an advocate
for them within the tribunal, and will persuade a least the third
arbitrator to support their case." 38 The author added, however, "This
assumption is seldom correct ... particularly in arbitrations under
rules requiring the party arbitrator to be as objective as the third
arbitrator." 39
Others are not so certain that European practice is so impeccable.
They refer to the notion that party-appointed arbitrators are inde-
pendent as a "pretense" and state, "European' practitioners and
arbitrators, however, cling to the theory, if not in the practice, of
demanding quasi-judicial 'independence,' thus increasing the risk of
confusion and hesitation where not only the attorneys but the three
arbitrators come from differing legal systems."' 4 Indeed, one of the
difficult problems is what a party-appointed arbitrator who intends
to be impartial is to do when the other party-appointed arbitrator
acts in a partisan fashion.
On the other hand, Professor Lowenfeld has indicated that such
confusion does not exist, for he asserts that many international
arbitration awards are unanimous. He states, "The suspicion, in
other words, that the chairperson decides and the other two arbitra-
tors are simply other kinds of advocates is not borne out in the
practice I have seen in the international commercial arena. ' 41
Regardless of the various views, parties, practitioners and arbitra-
tors must be careful that they are in compliance with the applicable
36. CRAiG, supra note 29, pt. III, at 32.
37. ASTA of California, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 754 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir.
1985) (modifying and quoting ASTA of California, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 702 F.2d
172, 175 (9th Cir. 1983)).
38. Goekjian, ICC Arbitration From a Practitioner's Perspective, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
407, 410 (1980).
39. Id.
40. Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pittfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus.
LAw. 1035, 1043-44 (1980).
41. Lowenfeld, Book Review, 42 A.R. J. 53 (Dec. 1987).
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laws and to the extent there are no controlling laws on the subject,
they spell out in advance what is expected of the party-appointed
arbitrators.
In international public arbitrations in the past, when a nation
appointed its own arbitrators-sometimes referred to as "national
judges" or "national commissioners"-they were often expected to
be partisan. Any ambiguity as to their role might be traced to the
question as to whether a public international arbitration is in reality
a diplomatic process. 42 After reviewing many authorities, an older
note in the Harvard Law Review concluded as follows:
As a rule, the national commissioner will consider himself bound
to vote for his government in addition to supporting its position at
the executive session only when the dispute involves matters of
fundamental national policy or raises issues not governed by well-
established principles of international law.
43
The issue as to the role of -the government-appointed arbitrator
has arisen in case of the so called "truncated tribunal"-i.e.,- when
a governmeht-appointed arbitrator resigns-generally after an instruc-
tion from his government-thereby attempting to prevent an award.
Recently, Judge Schwebel of the International Court of Justice, in
concluding that a withdrawing arbitrator should not be able to
frustrate the proceeding, viewed an arbitration among states as based
on a "judicial" model of arbitration rather than on a diplomatic
model. 4
It is difficult to imagine that nationals from certain authoritarian
or sectarian states can be truly independent or unbiased when ap-
pointed by the state or an entity of that state. Nevertheless, inter-
national arbitral bodies adhere to the notion of independence and
impartiality and rationalize this position by suggesting that coming
from the same "economic, political and social milieu" as the nom-
inating party does not iM itself suggest non-neutrality.
To attempt to adhere to and enforce a firm rule of independence
and impartiality in international arbitration would, in effect, inhibit
international arbitration involving a number of countries. Flexibility
appears to be the best policy so long as the parties and the arbitrators
are aware of and accept the ground rules.
42. Note, The Use of Tripartite Boards in Labor, Commercial, and International Arbi-
tration, 68 HARv. L. REv. 293, 325-39 (1954); Rosenzweig, International Arbitration as Viewed
by a Student of Labor Arbitration, 5 ARB. J. 212, 221 (1950); S. ScHwEmai, INTmuATioNAL
ARriTAXI0N: Twrum SAIMENT PROnBTS 144-54 (1987).
43. Note, supra note 42, at 337.
44. S. Schwebel, supra note 42, at 151; Lowenfeld, supra note 41, at 53.
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IV. THE IRN-UNImED STATES SLAims TRIBUNAL
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is an international arbitra-
tion mechanism that is a hybrid body involving, on the one hand,
commercial and non public international law issues and, on the other
hand, intergovernmental disputes and other disputes which call for
the application of public international law. The Tribunal was estab-
lished pursuant to the 1981 Algiers Declarations in order to adjudicate
various claims between nationals of the United State& against Iran,
nationals of Iran against the United States and the two governments
against each other. The Claims Settlement Declaration45 established
the Tribunal and provided that it was to consist of nine members-
three designated by the United States, three designated by Iran and
three chosen by the six-government appointed arbitrators.46
The Claims Settlement Declaration specifies that,
Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall
conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the
Tribunal to ensure that this Agreement can be carried out. The
UNCITRAL rules for appointing members of three-member Tri-
bunals shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the
Tribunal.47
Article 7 of the UNCITRAL rules provides that if "three arbitra-
tors are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.
The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator
who will act as to the presiding arbitrators of the Tribunal." In the
event the two party-appointed arbitrators fail to appoint the third
arbitrator, an appointing authority may upon request select the third
arbitrator. If the parties have not selected an appointing authority,
the party may request the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague to designate the appointing authority.
45. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 Jan. 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull 3 (Feb.
1981), reprinted in 20 INT'L LEoAL MATERiALs 230-33 (1981) [hereinafter Claims Settlement
Declaration]. This Claims Settlement Declaration is part of three other documents: A General
Declaration, an Undertakings Agreement and an Escrow Agreement. See 81 Dep't St. Bull. I
(Feb. 1981) reprinted in 20 IT'L LEaAL MATERiAS" 224-40 (1981).
46. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 45, art. III, 1.
47. Id. 2.
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At the Tribunal, the government designated arbitrators initially
agreed upon the third country arbitrators. Thereafter, on occasion,
the appointing authority, the Chief Justice of The Netherlands Su-
preme Court, selected the third country arbitrators.
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides:
A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to*those who approach him
in connexion with his possible appointment any circumstances likely
to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independ-
ence. An arbitrator, once appointed or chosen, shall disclose such
circumstances to the parties unless they have already been informed
by hini of these circumstances.
Article 10 provides:
1. Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence.
2. A party may challenge the arbitrator appointed by him only for
reasons of which he becomes aware after the appointment has
been made.
The Tribunal modified the UNCITRAL Rules in adopting its own
final rules. These rules incorporate in large part the UNCITRAL
Rules.4A In connection with the appointment of arbitrators, it was
made clear that the term "parties" refers to the governments. Thus,
although there are claimants that are non governmental parties, only
the governments designated "party-appointed" arbitrators.
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules was maintained unchanged,
except that the following language was added:
When any member of the arbitral tribunal obtains knowledge that
any particular case before the arbitral tribunal involves circum-
stances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality
or independence with respect to that case, he shall disclose such
circumstances to the President and, if the President so determines,
to the arbitrating parties in the case and, if appropriate, shall
disqualify himself as to that case.
The Tribunal also adopted "notes" to the various rules, which
"notes" relate to the duties of the arbitrators. The notes to Articles
9-12 are as follows:
1. As used in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules,
with respect to the initial appointment of a member the terms
48. See Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, reprinted in 2 Iran-United States Tribunal
Reports 405 (1984) (hereinafter Final Tribunal Rules]; B~ckstiegel, Applying the UNCITRAL
Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw.
266 (1985).
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"party" and "parties" mean one or both of the two Govern-
ments, as the case may be. After the initial appointment, the
terms "party" and "parties" mean the arbitrating party or
parties, as the case may be. Arbitrating parties may challenge a
member only on the basis of the existence of circumstances which
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the member's impartiality or
independence with respect to the particular case involved, and
not upon any general grounds which also relate to other cases.
Challenges on such general grounds may only be made by one
of the two Governments.
2. In applying paragraph 1 of Article 1I of the UNCITRAL Rules,
the period for making a challenge to a member of a Chamber
to which a case has been assigned shall be fifteen days after the
challenging party is given notice of the Chamber to which the
case has been assigned, or after the circumstances mentioned in
Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Rules became known to
that party. In the event the case is relinquished by the Chamber
to the Full Tribunal, the period for challenging a member who
is not a member of the relinquishing Chamber shall be fifteen
days after the challenging party is given notice of the relinquish-
ment, or after the circumstances mentioned in Articles 9 and 10
of the UNCITRAL Rules became known to that party.
3. In the event a member withdraws with respect to a particular
case or if the challenge is sustained, he shall continue to exercise
his functions as a member for all other cases and purposes except
in respect of that particular case.
4. In the event that a member of a Chamber is challenged with
respect to a particular case and withdraws, or if the challenge is
sustained, the President will order the transfer of the case to
another Chamber.
5. In the event the Full Tribunal is seised of a particular case and
a member is challenged with respect to that case and withdraws,
or if the challenge is sustained, a substitute member shall be
appointed to the Full Tribunal for the purposes of that case in
accordance with the procedure set forth in Article III of the
Claims Settlements Declaration as was used in appointing the
member being substituted. An appointing authority, if needed,
shall be designated as provided in Article 12 of the UNCITRAL
Rules.
6. Disclosure statements filed as to each member shall be made
available by the Registrar to each arbitrating party in each case.
Neither the UNCITRAL rules nor Tribunal modifications thereto
contain any distinction between party-appointed and non party-ap-
pointed arbitrators in connection with provisions concerning impar-
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tiality, independence, or disclosure. Thdre was an understanding
between the governments that the government-appointed arbitrators
could communicate with their governments about the selection of
third country arbitrators and about rules and procedures. It was also
understood between the governments that the arbitrators should not
discuss substantive issues or the merits of any case with the govern-
ments.
The American arbitrators provided detailed disclosure statements.
Indeed, at the outset, before designating its arbitrators, the United
States Government inquired as to whether any of the prospective
arbitrators had any connection with prospective American claimants
or claims. I am told that one former distinguished American jurist
was rendered ineligible for appointment because he or his law firm-
represented one of the major tribunal claimants in connection with
the subject matter of a claim that would be submitted to the Tribunal.
Moreover, in the event it turned out that any American arbitrator
or his firm had any interest or relationship with a claimant, the
arbitrator disqualified himself from sitting on any case in which that
claimant was a party.
Both the United States Government and the American arbitrators
took the position that the governments had no power or control over
the arbitrators. Thus, for example, the United States Government
never attempted to remove one of the arbitrators it had appointed.
In a number of cases American arbitrators did vote against American
parties and against the American government. 49 For example, the
American arbitrators joined in an award implementing an earlier
decision awarding Iran $500 million.50
Thus, the United States and American arbitrators adhered to the
general rule applicable to party-appointed arbitrators in international
commercial arbitrations. This may reflect, in part, the fact that one
of the American arbitrators, Judge Howard Holtzmann, was chair-
man of the AAA-ABA Committee that drafted the Code of Ethics
and was chairman of the United States delegation which participated
in the drafting of the UNCITRAL Rules. Judge Holtzmann's strongly
49. See, e.g., Morris v. Iran, 2 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 241 (1983);
Stone and Webster v. National Petrochemical Co., 1 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Reports 274 (1982); Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of Defence, 6 Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Reports 272 (1984); Iran v. United States, 5 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Reports 131 (1984).
50. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, 14 Iranian Assets Litigation
Reporter 240 (May 8, 1987).
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held views on the application of traditional international commercial
arbitration standards to the government-appointed arbitrators had an
influence on the implementation of these standards.
The Iranian arbitrators may have been in a more delicate situation.
Virtually all cases involved the Government of Iran. It may be more
difficult in a revolutionary environment to vote against one's own
government than against a national or company of one's own coun-
try. Interestingly, Iranian domestic law prohibited in a private con-
tract between an Iranian and a foreigner, a provision which binds
the parties to arbitration conducted by one or more arbitrators who
have the same nationality as the foreign party.5t An Iranian authority
noted, "The purpose of this restriction was to counterbalance the
practice of adhesion contracts. Especially in the area of international
trade, it has been felt that Iranian businessmen were in a weak
bargaining position." 52
Nevertheless, the Iranian Government and its arbitrators accepted
the provisions of the UNCITRAL rules and practices common in
international commercial arbitrations as they relate to the duties and
obligations of party-appointed arbitrators. The Iranian arbitrators,
who were competent lawyers or judges, submitted disclosure state-
ments, and they disqualified themselves in some cases in which they
had participated or had an interest. In other cases, after disclosure
were made, there were no challenges of the Iranian arbitrator.
Iranian arbitrators have joined in some awards against Iran, but
this occurred infrequently, and generally only when the award was
substantially less than the amount claimed.53 Under the UNCITRAL
and Tribunal Rules, an award requires a majority.54 Contrary to my
expressed view, there were multiple majorities in cases, which, in
effect, often gave decisive power to the chairman.55
There have been some suggestions that Iran and at least some of
its arbitrators may have had in reality a different conception of the
relationship between party-appointed arbitrators and their govern-
51. Iran Code of Civil Procedure § 633 (Sabi Trans. 1972); Abdoh, National Report Iran,
IV CowmRmCtc.x AB -TATioN Y.B. 81, 84 (1979); Id. at 219.
52. Abdoh, supra note 51, at 84.
53. See Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 361 (1985).
Iranian arbitrators often signed arbitral awards and indicated "concurring and dissenting"
without specifying to' which portion there was dissent or to which portion there was a
concurrence.
54. Final Tribunal Rules, supra note 48, art. 31(1).
55. See Ultrasystems Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 77, 82
(1983) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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.ments.s6 Some of the Iranian arbitrators had actually worked on
Tribunal claims in the legal office that handled claims before the
Tribunal. A former American Agent to the Tribunal, Arthur Rovine,
recounted,
For example, just a week or so ago my counterpart, the Iranian
Agent, told me that he had heard rumors that the American
Government was going to withdraw one of the American arbitrators.
I was astonished, and I asked him to repeat what he had just said.
Ana he said it again. I informed him that the American Government
doesn't have the legal power to withdraw any of the American
arbitrators. Mr. Kashan, the Iranian Agent, seemed genuinely sur-
prised. He asked, suppose the American arbitrator wanted to stay
for 10 years? I said he could stay for 10 years.. And Mr. Kashan
just shook his head. He then went on to inform me that his
government was thinking seriously of withdrawing one of the Iranian
officials in the Registry. I said that the Registry staff didn't work
for either government. It worked for the Tribunal. He said "Oh
that's all right. We can withdraw the people in the Registry and
we're seriously thinking of doing just that."
Clearly there's a fundamental difference of approach and it is
reflected in all that goes on.5
Undoubtedly, Iranian representatives believed that American ar-
bitrators were no more unbiased or independent than Iranian arbi-
trators. 8
Even if there have been variations in views on the practices of
governmefit-appointed arbitrators, the Tribunal has been operating
relatively successfully. The governments and the parties before the
Tribunal have had kriowledge of the roles and relationship and views
of the arbitrators and have, with a few exceptions, not made any
k6. See, e.g., ITT Indus. v. Iran, 2 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 348, 349
(1984) (Aldrich, J. concurring); Ultrasystems, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Reports at 121 (1983) (Mosk, J., concurring); Mahmoud Kashani dissenting with regard to
Presidential Order No. 31, 6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 303 (1984); Documents
Arising from the Episode of 3 September 1984, 7 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports
281, 281-316 (1984); Feldman, Ted L. Stein on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal-Scholarship par
Excellence, 61 WAsHr. L. REv. 997, 1004 (1986); S. Schwebel, supra note 42, at 253-96;
Proceedings of the 77th Annual Meeting (April 14-16, 1983), 30 American Society of Inter-
national Law 26.
57. American Society of International Law, supra note 56, at 26.
58. Aksen, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules- An Early Comment, in Tnn ART op ABnrraAtION 1, 4 (J. Schultsz & A.J. van den
Berg eds. 1982); see ITT Indus., Inc. v. Iran 2, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports
348 (1983); Note by Dr. Shafie Shafeiei Regarding the Concurring Opinion of George H.
Aldrich, 2 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, 356, 356-58 (criticizing American
arbitrator for allegedly not being impartial).
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challenges. Over the.past few years Iranian and American arbitrators
have participated fully in the arbitral process. Reasoned decisions
and opinions have been and are being rendered and published.59
Generally, despite diplomatic differences between Iran and the United
States and some sharply worded opinions (which are not unheard of
in American appellate cases), Iranian and United States representa-
tives to the Tribunal and the arbitrators work together in a civil and
courteous manner.
Basically, the UNCITRAL Rules and general principles applicable
to international commercial arbitration have worked well in the
context of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Although the
Tribunal's operation has not been uniformly smooth, it has not faced
the fatal disruptions that some other public international arbitral
bodies have encountered.6
0
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has overcome a number
of obstacles, including hostile governments, sensitive and complicated
issues, different legal systems and languages and other problems.
Importantly, the Tribunal, the governments and the parties before
the Tribunal accepted in principle, if not in practice, the concept of
independent party-appointed arbitrators who are supposed to adhere
to the same ethical standards as the neutral or third party arbitrators.
Parties before the Tribunal were aware at all times of the possibility
of any actual partiality or lack of independence. The Tribunal and
the parties demonstrated the necessary flexibility to cope with any
deviations from the standards normally applicable to party-appointed
arbitrators in international arbitrations.
59. Awards and decisions are reported in Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports
(Grotius Publications Limited); Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter (Andrews Publications);
Mealey's Litigation Reports-Iranian Claims (Mealey Publications); and on WESTLAW.
60. See Note, supra note 42, at 329-32; S. Schwebel, supra note 42, at 253.
